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Ordoliberalism has undergone a dramatic resurgence as a characterisation of the 
contemporary EU and its economic dimensions. Commentators have pointed to the 
‘ordoliberalisation’ of EU economic policy with Germany at its core, albeit taking the 
role of a ‘reluctant hegemon’. Perhaps as a result of this pervasive influence, some 
have claimed that the EU is itself ordoliberal, resting on a particular understanding 
of the relationship between ordoliberalism and an ‘economic constitution’. For this 
claim to be substantiated, the characterisation of ordoliberalism needs to persist 
across time and the EU’s law and policy-making spaces. In this article, we examine 
this proposition, and argue that the influence of ordoliberalism can help a richer 
understanding of the contemporary EU beyond the confines of the economic 
constitution and into its evolving legal system(s). 
 
Introduction 
Ordoliberalism has come back into fashion as a means of characterising the EU and 
European integration. Recent commentary revisits their assumed strong connection 
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as inextricably linked since the outset of the integration process (Siems and 
Schnyder, 2014). Somma (2013, p.105), for example, claims that the EU was conceived 
as an ordoliberal construct from the outset. Moss (2000, p.251) describes the Treaty of 
Rome as representing, ‘a triumph of German ordoliberalism, a market philosophy 
that recognized the need for regulating laws and institutions’. Whilst these risk being 
seen as reductive views that obscure a significant amount of debate about the form 
and normative purposes of the EU, it is a defensible proposition that the EU exhibits 
characteristics which can be traced to the ‘Ordoliberal School’ of German economists 
beginning in the 1930s (Nedergaard and Snaith, 2015, p.1096). Nevertheless, the 
extent to which ordoliberalism exerted itself as a foundational concept in EU 
integration is contested (Akman, 2014; Montalban, et.al., 2011). Given the enduring 
crisis of confidence engulfing the EU stemming from the euro crisis, Brexit, and the 
re-emergence of populism in electoral politics, returning to the questions posed and 
assumptions made at earlier stages of EU integration is pertinent.   
 
Ordoliberalism is at its heart a credo about the creation of an economic constitution, 
which is market-supporting rather than market-distorting, and is enforced through a 
system of law. We argue however that the influence of ordoliberalism can help a 
richer understanding of the contemporary EU beyond the economic constitution’s 
confines. We do so for two reasons. First, because recent commentary on 
ordoliberalism reveals that it is a very broad church, and can be taken to inspire a 
wide range of outcomes (Jacoby, 2014, p. 73). Thus, we return to the core tenets of 
ordoliberalism, whilst recognising that these are not the subject of universal 
agreement. Second, the EU’s crisis of confidence does not stem merely from the state 
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of its economic constitution but spans across the EU’s spheres of activity, bringing 
into question the means of integration during the Union’s 60 years. 
 
 
Ordoliberalism as a descriptor  
Ordoliberalism does not consist of a fully-fledged set of principles, values or 
conditions that enable it to be easily distinguished from other macroeconomic 
approaches (such as Keynsianism or (neo-)liberalism) (Nedergaard and Snaith, 2015, 
p.1097). Its content can be briefly summarized as follows: efficient markets do not 
arise spontaneously; making markets function requires ‘constitutive rules’; these 
rules involve an onus on price stability; law (particularly competition/anti-trust 
regulation) is necessary to ensure enforcement; and lastly that the ‘social’ function of 
ordoliberalism is served by the stabilisation of market functions rather than by 
redistribution.  
 
The sense that a liberal market order requires the active regulation of potentially 
monopolistic actors in order to better locate it within society has led authors such as 
Bonefeld (2012) to emphasize the role played by the ‘strong state’ in ordoliberalism.  
This is not an uncontested characterisation. In detailing the historic evolution of the 
Freiburg School’s philosophy, Berghahn and Young posit that the core of 
ordoliberalism lies in ‘the creation of a competitive market economy in which the 
state did not play a major role, but merely set a constitutional framework, an ordo, 
within which the economy could freely unfold’ (2013, p.771). Thus, the state is not 
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‘strong’ in the sense of autocratic or overbearing, but rather is a disciplined enforcer 
of the ordo, particularly as it pertains to enforcing business adherence to these rules. 
Young (2014, p.277-278) for example states that ‘Ordoliberalism…calls for a political-
economic order (Ordnungspolitik) which organizes competitiveness and competitive 
markets in such a way to prevent private power (in the form of industrial cartels and 
labor unions) and public power (socialist nationalization)’. 
 
We first trace the emergence of ordoliberalism. In distilling the varieties of 
ordoliberal thought, we distinguish the coexistence of two possible, broad readings: 
one specifying a minimalist form of economic constitutionalism (prescribing the least 
law possible to guarantee macroeconomic stability), and the other a more maximalist 
form, entailing a particular type of socio-economic policy (typically enforcing market 
competition and monetary discipline). We suggest that conflict between these two 
readings is responsible for the disagreements amongst observers of ordoliberalism. 
For example, if initiatives such as the European Banking Union (Siems and Schnyder, 
2014, Young, 2014) are ordo or not. In determining whether the contemporary EU is 
ordo, we therefore seek evidence of both a general system of law structuring 
economic competition (for which we look towards the legal order(s) of the EU) and 
more specific economic policies aimed at fostering competition. Furthermore, the 
concept of ordoliberalisation supposes that these logics are more present now than 
previously. We consider whether these two logics are entirely consistent: in 
particular, whether differentiated integration is an example of ordoliberalisation or 
not (as it is an example of minimalist regulatory law, but potentially not of economic 
harmonisation). We find here that ordoliberal ideas may help to describe the 
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constitutional logic of the EU, but cannot explain the trajectory of integration, not 




Ordoliberalism and the German experience 
The upsurge in using ordoliberalism as an explanatory factor in the construction of, 
in particular, the euro crisis, has resulted in some thoughtful articles detailing its 
intellectual lineage (Bonefeld, 2012, Bergahn and Young, 2013, Ryner 2015). Although 
falling out of favour during the 1990s and 2000s, ordoliberalism never fully 
disappeared. Many of the seminal works on its evolution considerably pre-date its 
resurgent popularity. The influence of ordoliberal ideas was particularly strong 
during the founding period of the Bundesrepublik, when there was an urgent need for 
a workable constitutional philosophy in order to rebuild the economy. For similar 
reasons, it also gained in political significance during the period of German 
reunification (Grossekettler, 1994).  
 
Unifying the different readings of ordoliberalism is a strong notion of the role of law 
in regulating the relationship between state, market, and society. The historical 
backdrop of the Freiburg school, located in the catastrophes of Weimar Germany and 
the descent into war, make this focus on ‘constitutionalising the economy’ (Gerber, 
1994) unsurprising. The term ‘ordoliberalism’ was first used in a 1950 edition of the 
journal ORDO, but many of its core insights were already in existence by that point 
(Siems and Schnyder 2014, p.379). Eucken, Erhard, Röpke, Böhm and other adherents 
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of the Freiburg School saw, to varying degrees, the unfettered concentration of 
economic power in the hands of monopolistic or oligopolistic organisations as a 
social ill, and thus something that ought to be designed out of the system.  
 
Yet, there remain disagreements over the form of ordoliberalism in Germany and 
beyond. This can be traced to its Janus-faced characterisation as both a sociological 
and economic theory. Sally (1996) argues that there are, plausibly, two distinct 
schools of thought subsumed within it. The first consists of the legal and economic 
approaches of the Freiburg School (Eucken, Böhm) and the second a more 
sociological interpretation (Müller-Armack, Röpke, Rüstow). Young (2014) posits 
that the more sociological ‘version’ enabled those on the German left to appropriate 
ordoliberal ideas whilst implementing social welfarist policies, which can be 
considered ordoliberal only to the extent that they are not market-distorting. The two 
approaches cannot be fully disentangled, but the former is the strain usually selected 
for analysis in the EU context (see e.g. Grossekettler, 1994). Sally quotes the ‘ordo 
manifesto’, which claims that the bedrock of ordoliberalism ‘consists of viewing 
individual economic questions as constituent parts of a greater whole’ (1996, p.234).  
 
Though having some influence on the ‘Chicago School’ of neoliberalism and 
developments in other countries (Ban 2013), ordoliberalism’s principal contribution 
has been largely confined to Germany. However, even within Germany, the role of 
ordoliberalism is disputed. For instance, Dullien and Guérot (2012, p.5-7) argue that 
ordoliberalism penetrated various sectors of German society, including (to 
admittedly very different extents) the five main political parties. Young (2014, p.284) 
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however contends that Germany’s behaviour in EU negotiations owes little to the 
practices that have structured the domestic economy, and instead functions as a form 
of discursive myth-making (Joerges, 2010a, 2010b). The risks in associating 
contemporary German and EU decision-making with ordoliberalism lie in assuming 
an unbroken lineage between ‘original’ ordoliberal thought and the way in which it 
has transformed, particularly in Germany (Lorch, 2013, p.70), or in assuming that 
contemporary German ordoliberals do not themselves disagree (Jacoby, 2014, p.71). 
Nevertheless, both approaches accept that ordoliberalism has structured German 
political thought, and we proceed on the basis that Germany’s long history of 
ordoliberalism had some impact on the EU’s own evolution. 
 
 
Ordoliberalism and the EU 
Given the continuing context of the euro crisis and the (perceived) role of Germany 
as an economic, and even a political, hegemon (Paterson, 2011; Bulmer and Paterson, 
2013) it is unsurprising that a school of thought grounded so squarely in the German 
political experience should be once again invoked as an explanatory factor in the 
EU’s political actions. In this vein, Dullien and Guérot (2012, p.1) argue that crisis 
moves such as the signing of the Fiscal Compact in 2012 reflect ‘German positions 
rather than collective compromise’ and that this is grounded in an ‘ideological 
edifice behind German economic orthodoxy with which Germany’s partners must 
engage’, namely ordoliberalism and its prioritisation of ‘stability’ over ‘solidarity’ 
(Crespy and Schmidt, 2014, p.1097). Schäfer (2016, p.962) finds in relation to the 
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banking union that it was not material interests but ordoliberal ideas that provided 
the primary source of the German government’s preferences. Repeated references to 
Germany and ordoliberalism have become commonplace (Jacoby, 2014, p.1), placing 
the responsibility for EU outcomes not only on Germany, but also more 
fundamentally on German political thought. This is also reflected in the 
representation of German thinking in the European media (Ojala and Harjuniemi, 
2016).  
 
The focus of ordoliberalism on the role of the market economy in society and how it 
could be better embedded through constitutionalisation in order to prevent conflict, 
is a characterisation that bears at least superficial similarity to the initial goals of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). For ordoliberals, the role of government is to 
intervene in a ‘market conforming’ direction in order to bolster the activities of free 
enterprise (Snyder and Siems 2014). This is where the roots of the European project 
lie: as Robert Marjolin surmized in his memoirs, ‘who would have thought during 
the 1930s…that European states…would form a common market intended 
eventually to become an economic area that could be linked to one great dynamic 
market?’ (quoted in Dinan, 2005, p.35).  
 
Ordoliberalism’s association with the idea of a ‘social market economy’ (Bonefeld, 
2012, p.634) is a significant link. This phrase was written into the first part of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) at Maastricht, illustrating a concurrence between 
the values of ordoliberalism and the policy orientation of the EU. László Andor, 
Commissioner for Employment (2010-2014), has specifically pointed to the origins of 
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the term with the Freiburg school and with post-war Germany’s needs (2011). He 
thus finds it to be no coincidence that the concept of the social market economy 
should accompany the single market. Dale and El-Elany (2013) express scepticism 
about the ‘social’ dimension, arguing (through a Marxist analysis) that the 
development of a socially just Europe has been impeded by a reliance on ordoliberal 
ideas of the absolutism of law, rather than democratic pluralism. 
 
In the EU context, work on ordoliberal influences usually coalesce around two policy 
areas: competition (Gerber 1994) and economic and monetary union (EMU) (Dyson 
and Featherstone, 1999). Both of these ‘function in the operation of economic 
processes’ (Walters and Haahr, 2005, p.47) and provide the economic constitution 
where ordoliberal influence can most obviously be perceived. Authors operating 
across the different traditions of ordoliberalism have suggested that its institutional 
influence over the EU is long-standing and more fundamental than on these two 
policy fields. Rose and Ngwe (2007, p.8) point to the influence of two prominent 
German ordoliberals, Walter Hallstein (first president of the Commission) and Hans 
von der Groeben (co-author of the Spaak report) in shaping the early evolution of the 
European integration project. In our analysis, we accept that the importance of the 
success of the European project in the early years, and the centrality of Germany to 
it, make it highly likely that ordoliberalism provided a synergy between the 
organisation of both the German economic constitution and that of the EU. 
 
For many the ‘German consensus’ finds itself uploaded through the ideological 
culture of the Bundesbank (Dyson, 2009) to European institutions (Young 2014) and 
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thus constitutes an ‘ordoliberalisation of Europe’ (Biebricher, 2014, p.17). Others 
however argue that we ought to be sceptical about the extent to which recent EU 
policy-making has really fitted this bill, and about whether even Germany itself is so 
ordoliberal in practice (Siems and Schnyder 2014). We agree with this scepticism, 
insofar as we look beyond the (economic) fields in which the culture of the 
Bundesbank might be uploaded. The differences within ordoliberal thought, and the 
limitations of policy prescriptions outlined in the 1950s, entail that it is hard to infer a 
singular ‘ordoliberal’ or German position on many contemporary policy issues, or to 
reconcile differences between German and EU policy directions (Anderson, 2005, 
pp.90-91).  
 
We noted above that ordoliberalism may have become more dominant in recent 
epochs than was the case in the past. As Anderson (2009, p.65) has claimed, it may 
have been over time ‘somewhat a recessive gene in the makeup of the Community, 
latent but never the most salient in its development’. The European Central Bank 
(ECB), for example, is a more recent creation and is often portrayed as an ordoliberal 
institution, with one Board Member (Otmar Issing) explicitly describing Walter 
Eucken as a key ‘intellectual antecedent’ of it (Issing, 2004). But as Bibow 
demonstrates (2012, p.5-7), Eucken’s own views were aligned more closely with a 
Friedman-esque automatic monetary stabiliser that would not possess the right to 
challenge government policy, than with an all-powerful discretionary and 
independent central bank. Whilst the ECB is widely regarded as a ‘made in 
Germany’ product (Bibow, 2009, p.6), drawing a consistent and singular lineage from 
ordoliberal thought to the institutional settlement of EMU is a more challenging task, 
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but one achieved in the seminal work by Dyson and Featherstone (1999). For the 
purposes of the argument advanced here, we thus accept that there is a relationship 
between ordoliberalism and the EU which has been maintained, whether or not this 
is by design or merely because of the importance of the (institutional) actors 
involved. 
 
Returning to the central concern of ordoliberalism, which we regard to be the 
creation and enforcement of an economic constitution, it is relatively straightforward 
to envisage how the EU fits within this frame and the roles played by law and legal 
dynamics. Throughout the integration process, though not always with sustained 
vigour, the EU institutions have made extensive use of the ‘Community method’: 
producing regulations and directives which through their volume and technicality 
have put in place a legal framework which is not merely economic but also social 
(Weiler, 1999; MacAmhlaigh, 2011). However, despite the surface synergy between 
both this type of framework and ordoliberalism, Joerges has suggested that 
ordoliberalism was not a strong force at the outset of the EU, but only visible when 
European competition began to focus on anticompetitive state activities and 
regulatory practices (Joerges, 2010c, p.69). Thus, we need also to consider governance 
capacity in determining the ordoliberal quality of the EU: without a strong roster of 
competences, it was practically unable to display ordoliberal tendencies. The 
regulatory instruments that can be viewed as according with ordoliberalism remain 
the primary mechanism for EU integration, despite the emergence of ‘new modes’ of 
governance (characterized by the Commission’s White Paper on Governance (2001) 
as a variation on the ‘Community method’, rather than replacing it) and in more 
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recent years a lower number of actual or planned legislative proposals (Cardwell and 
Hervey, 2015, p.77), especially in the field of ‘Social Europe’ (Armstrong, 2010). 
However, the legal-institutional set up of the Union is largely a product (without a 
parallel elsewhere in the world) of the need for policies that are capable of regulating  
Member States in the most logically pragmatic way. Thus, it may be that 
ordoliberalism in the EU is more the outcome of compromise than ideology, a point to 
which we return later.  
 
Nonetheless, a reading of the EU that emphasizes only economic policy appears 
reductive since the Treaty does not convey a purpose focussed only on economic 
integration (‘The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its 
peoples’, Article 3(1) TEU). Further, the overall increase in volume of law and policy-
making in fields that serve purposes other than economic regulation (such as the 
environment, development, justice and home affairs, and some aspects of foreign 
policy) raises questions about whether ordoliberalism remains relevant. Certainly, if 
the original ordoliberal ideals were adhered to, in the sense that the economic and 
non-economic matters were ‘decoupled’ (Parker, 2013, p.59) then there would be 
little place in the EU’s order for consideration of, for example, citizens’ rights beyond 
those which applied to the economic foundation of the free movement of workers. 
Issing (2002, p.347) warned of the theoretical and practical risks associated with  
pursuing enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination alongside fiscal and wage 
policies. As Ryner and Cafruny (2016, p.62) have argued, the TEU’s post-Maastricht 
pillar structure kept the main innovations deliberately separate from the ‘core’ 
integration of the single market. Yet over time (particularly in the field of justice and 
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home affairs) they have found their way into the core competences of the former 
‘first’ pillar.  By extension, ordoliberalism would seem to have little application to 
policies that have no, or very little, market-correcting function but which the EU has 
vigorously pursued, including environmental and consumer law. Thus, although the 
‘long shadow of ordoliberalism’ (Dullien and Guérot, 2012) might be witnessed 
across the EU polity, its usual analytical application is in fact much more narrow and 
based on studies of specific policies.  
 
We suggest in the rest of the article that despite these obfuscations, ordoliberalism 
can serve as a means for understanding EU integration if it is treated as a descriptive 
rather than explanatory concept: in order words, the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’. 
Using ordoliberalism in this way helps clarify how the term can be appropriately 
applied to contemporary integration. The value in doing so is to avoid the 
temptation to identify ordoliberalism as the main or partial motivation for particular 
outcomes. Rather, its descriptive qualities help further an understanding of how 
different aspects of European integration correspond to different varieties of 
ordoliberalism rather than predict certain outcomes or developments. This approach 
must take into account a presumed ordoliberal preference for top-down regulation 
(Siems and Schnyder, 2014, p.387) and bring to the fore the economic and political 
reasons for doing so which, returning to the limitations identified above, may differ 
from the earlier days of the EU. The prism through which we take this approach is 
the relationship between ordoliberalism and the EU’s legal order(s). 
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Governing through law? 
The most obvious way in which ordoliberalism can be seen is through the 
structuring effects of law. Since law sets the ‘rules of the game’, it comprises the 
‘ordo’ and defines the economic constitution. For most lawyers, ordoliberal 
philosophy is most commonly associated with EU competition law. Competition law 
became synonymous with a doctrinal legal approach, given the density of legal 
decision-making and relationship to state-like functions. Gerber (1994, p.49) 
describes competition law as the ‘keystone of the ordoliberal programme’ aimed at 
‘constitutionalizing the economy’, but competition law is arguably unrepresentative 
of the EU’s functioning. On the one hand, competition law is typical of EU law and 
its reach: it affects private, economic entities directly, as well as the Member States, 
and has enforceable effects. On the other hand, competition law is an area in which, 
unusually, harmonisation does not appear to be the appropriate characterisation. 
Many Member States had no competition law prior to joining the EU and yet the 
enforcement of EU competition law occurs at the national level (see, for example, 
Baudenbacher, 2016). Since competition law exists of course in states outside the EU, 
it is not a product of ordoliberalism itself. But the way in which competition law 
operates in the EU is different. It is unusual in terms of the role and powers of the 
Commission, which come much closer to those that we expect of an Executive in a 
nation-state context. Investigations of large, household-name companies, and the 
process of doing so (such as dawn raids) gives the Commission a very public and 
politicised role, and much more so than in other areas of its activity. Competition law 
appears to balance free market thinking combined with market-correcting, consumer 
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protection goals: both of which are contained within the Treaty preamble. It is also a 
policy area which is strongly affected by beliefs about economic structuring and 
organisation, of which ordoliberalism is only one (Bartalevich, 2016, p.268). 
 
The ’conventional’ characterisation of competition law as an ordoliberal construct 
has been subject to challenge, in particular by Akman (2009; 2014). She contends that 
competition law’s ordoliberal origins are a myth, bolstered by a stream of literature 
supporting a particular reading of its core provisions (Articles 101-102 TFEU). She 
attributes the myth to the historical context and individuals involved in the Treaty 
negotiations (Akman and Kassim, 2010, p.127). Instead, she contends that an 
ordoliberal reading of the competition provisions cannot render their objectives 
‘welfarist’ or efficiency-based (p.127) and that the target of lawmakers was inefficient 
market power and its abusive exercise (see also, Mestmäker, 2011), rather than 
market power per se.  
 
Regardless, the development of EU competition law (which directly interacts with 
and impacts on private economic actors) demonstrates the importance of legal 
measures, and particularly EU law, to the governance of non-state actors. Taking a 
wider view, we can accept that the origins of ordoliberalism and the EU’s legal 
structure are contested, but focus on whether the contemporary EU has come to 
reflect some of ordoliberalism’s tenets via alternative routes. 
 
In the contemporary context, it is possible to detect ordoliberalism in EU governance 
beyond the ‘Community method’. Indeed, much of the ‘steering’ qualities of law 
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operate through legal, or quasi-legal instruments such as ‘pacts’, which apply across 
various different policy sectors and which are not legally enforceable in the same 
way (Cardwell, 2016, p.372). It is equally not difficult to find evidence for these 
processes occurring within sectors conventionally associated with ordoliberal ideas, 
such as economic constitutionalism (in the form of the Stability and Growth Pact). 
For example, Siems and Schnyder (2014, p.388) note the openness of contemporary 
ordoliberals towards the proliferating measures on international economic 
regulation, which was (unsurprisingly) not a point of consideration for the original 
ordoliberals. In the EU context, they particularly emphasize the moves made in 
financial regulation, such as the establishment of the European Supervisory Agencies 
in 2011, and the partial institution of Banking Union, which are arguably more in line 
with ‘supervisory’ governance than traditional regulation. (Young (2014, p.278) 
however disagrees that the Banking Union is an ordo creation, stating that ‘the 
ordoliberal economists saw this as a ploy to introduce a mutualization of the 
Eurozone peripheral debt. The Keynesian reply was adamant in rejecting these 
charges’). We may therefore detect ordo blueprints in these initiatives, but only 
through dynamics which differ from what we traditionally conceive as ‘law’. 
 
Moving away from this more ‘traditional’ terrain for ordoliberalism, it is possible to 
find regulatory styles that fit a market-conforming regulatory paradigm in other 
areas, such as justice and home affairs. Nonetheless, not all policy areas are as 
susceptible to this analysis and we recognize the danger of categorising any use of 
modes of governance related to economic or social constitutionalism, as necessarily 
being ordoliberal. As Chalmers and Szyszczak (1998, p.42) have pointed out, ‘the 
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language of individual freedoms marginalizes collective interests such as 
environmental policy or economic and social cohesion’ and cannot explain special 
regimes for agriculture, public undertakings, and non-EU trade relations. Yet, in 
Foucault’s perhaps unorthodox rendering, ordoliberalism is ‘both in practice and 
theory, the most clearly stated liberal governmentality. A governmentality that 
regulates the behavior of subjects between each other: the behavior of the governed 
among themselves, as well as their behavior towards the government’ (Goldschmidt 
and Rauchenschwandtner, 2007, p.2). As such, it is not inherently incompatible with 
the idea of the state providing collective security in certain areas. The more obvious 
tension occurs where these measures are explicitly market distorting 
(‘nonconforming intervention’) such as the Common Agricultural Policy (Dale and 
El-Enany, 2013, p.621). 
 
However, it is not only the content of the law that is important, but also its 
implementation and institutional context. The ‘new legal order’, as distinct from both 
national law and ‘classic’ international law, was recognized by the Court of Justice in 
van Gend en Loos as early as 1963. But here, the Court was primarily responsible for 
forging a constitutional template, rather than legislative arrangements. In later cases, 
the Court found that EU law enjoyed ‘primacy’ over national law (Costa v ENEL, 
1964; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1971) despite the absence of such a 
formulation in the Treaty. In this respect, the Court arguably behaved much more 
like a law-making court familiar to common lawyers than those in continental 
Europe. Understanding the legal system of the EU cannot therefore be restricted to 
legislative outputs but must appreciate the role of the Courts, which includes 
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national courts, all of which are responsible for applying EU law. A wealth of 
literature has focussed on the Court of Justice’s ‘activism’ (see, for example, Hartley, 
1996; Arnull, 1996) but the important point to draw here is that national law and EU 
law cannot be considered as separate, hermetically sealed legal orders with no 
influence on each other.  
 
Whilst the possibility of transmission of ordoliberalism from the German system to 
the EU via some of its institutions is supported, describing the Court’s innovations 
(insofar as it has embedded the importance of EU law in national systems) as 
ordoliberal in character is much more difficult unless it is assumed that the text of 
the Treaty that the Court is applying is, in itself, ordoliberal. We do not support this 
position, but rather (as the points we make later in this article demonstrate) that the 
emergence of differentiated integration challenges the characterisation of the EU as 
the product of continued, strong ordoliberal influence.  
 
Shifting the focus from the Court, the key question of who enforces EU law was 
resolved at the outset by allowing the Commission multiple roles of ‘motor of 
integration’ and enforcer. Regardless of policy area under examination, none of these 
forms of organisation could work in contexts other than the EU because of the nature 
of ‘voluntaristic agreements among sovereign states’ (Siems and Schnyder, 2014, 
p.388). The operation of legal principles, including primacy and the Commission as 
‘guardian’ suggests that only in the EU is supranational authority able to guarantee 
ordoliberal aims in conjunction with national (legal) authority. 
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Whilst there is a legitimate case to be made that the EU consists of a 
constitutionalized system, there is still a difference in describing it as a fully 
ordoliberal system. This is not least because ordoliberalism suggests an ideological 
and constitutional order designed principally to regulate economic affairs in a certain 
way, whilst the EU is not merely focussed on economic integration. As Walker (2016) 
has noted, the constitutional pluralism of the EU’s legal system continues to eschew 
singular or federalist alternatives. Stating that there is such a thing as a legal or 
constitutional system of the EU suggests that it is possible to regard the EU’s policies 
as fundamentally ‘ordered’, if we take for granted the roles of the institutions in 
making the rules, even when done so by the Court (for example, the Cassis de Dijon 
principle of mutual recognition).  
 
But to do so does not take into account the multiplicity of legal orders operating 
within the contemporary EU, which have increased to the extent that it is more 
difficult to speak of the EU’s ‘legal order’ in the singular (Cardwell and Hervey, 
2015, p.82). As the possibility of increasing differentiated integration has begun to 
find (reluctant) acceptance within even the Commission (Commission, 2017), we 
need therefore to consider how this phenomena fits with the narrative of an 
ordoliberal ‘economic constitution’ in the EU. 
 
Differentiated integration and ordoliberalism 
The European integration process has shown more evidence of fragmentation in the 
post-Maastricht period, as the EU has expanded into ‘newer’ spheres of integration, 
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such as justice and home affairs. In the past, differentiated integration was very 
limited: the Luxembourg compromise arising from the mid-1960s ‘empty chair’ crisis 
(Teasdale, 1993) suggested that national vetos were (in theory) still available, there 
were few examples of where some were further down the path of integration than 
others. Now, the ‘variable geometry’ includes Member States that do not apply parts 
of EMU, Schengen, aspects of foreign/defence policy or the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Avbelj, 2013, Dyson and Sepos, 2010).  
 
The lengthy process which eventually led to the Treaty of Lisbon revealed the extent 
Member States were keen to have national-focussed provisions. The high number of 
protocols (37) and declarations (65) added to the Treaty are evidence of this. Calls for 
enshrining differential integration have become more prominent and the institutions 
have begun to drop long-standing resistance (Piris, 2012, Commission, 2017). The 
view of the EU as a single legal order following a singular path of integration starts 
to become more problematic, in turn challenging the characterisation of the EU as an 
ordoliberal enterprise. Parts of the EU are undoubtedly subject to a set of regulations 
that are, at the very least, compatible with ordoliberal ideas (Nedergaard and Snaith, 
2015), such as EMU. But, in creating these more ordoliberal spheres containing only 
some members (by choice), the rest of the EU is becoming comparatively fragmented.  
 
Thus, a central conflict at the heart of the economic constitutionalism as a meeting 
point between law and political economy is whether the idea of an ordoliberal EU is 
challenged by differentiated integration, or whether a rule-based framework that 
specifies only minimum levels of convergence is actually quite an ordo construction? 
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After all, in as much as ordoliberalism serves as a model to regulate the relationship 
between state and society, a minimalist framework built around effective co-
operation seems quite ordoliberal in character, even if the result is an uneven 
framework. It would be defensible to suggest that if the ‘core’ of integration was 
composed of the ordo-inspired economic aspects, with a ‘periphery’ of non-economic 
areas which were the subject of differentiated integration, then the EU could be most 
easily categorized as ordoliberal. But we do not argue this here, since (and referring 
to the discussion above), the EU’s activities cannot be so easily divided in legal or 
institutional terms. Indeed, legal scholars have puzzled over the seemingly 
established terms of legal ‘order’ or ‘system’, which now appear inappropriate to 
capture the EU’s complexity. This can explain the alternative uses of legal ‘space’, 
‘architecture’ or ‘pluralism’ (MacCormick, 1999, De Búrca and Weiler, 2011, Walker 
et.al., 2011, Walker, 2016).  
 
Within a differentiated integration process, we find that ordoliberalism may be an 
appropriate characterisation in some areas but is futile to suggest a strict separation 
between ordo and non-ordo areas. Rather, the examples of Member States opting out 
of aspects of the integration process (or at the very least, seeking to do so) reflect the 
EU’s organisational structure as one that we suggest is premised on institutional 
compromise. Furthermore the very procedures of negotiation as part of the 
integration process may be significant in determining the ‘ordoliberalisation’ of the 
outcome or the influence of Germany as a central, ordoliberal player. It is on this that 
we focus the final part of the discussion: the idea that ordoliberalism in the EU can 
be described as a fundamental outcome of compromise; both by virtue of the 
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capabilities of the nation-state actors involved, and because ordoliberal outcomes 
represent minimal acceptable scenarios for all.  
 
Ordoliberalism as constitutional compromise? 
In examining the (re)emergence of ordoliberalism, we encounter the independent 
variable problem: even if it looks like ordoliberalism, it does not necessarily mean that 
it is ordoliberalism. We examine three possible readings of the EU’s 
‘ordoliberalisation’. The first is that ordoliberalism is an inevitable consequence of 
the increased role of German power politics in the contemporary EU. Second, that 
ordoliberalism arises as the outcome of ideological compromise. Third, that 
ordoliberalism is a reflection of the type of economic integration that has been 
recently pursued. In the interests of avoiding overclaiming, we incorporate into these 
readings the chance that phenomena and outcomes appear to be ordoliberal without 
actually being so.  The readings are also an attempt to tackle the implicit problem of 
agency and intentionalism that is wrapped up in any attempt to read ordoliberal 
‘uploading’ to the EU level, hence our emphasis on ordoliberalism’s descriptive 
qualities.  
 
The first reading reflects a conscious strategy on the part of German policy-makers to 
reshape the EU in its own image. It is sometimes claimed within the more critical 
literature that ordoliberalism in Europe arises due to the conscious strategies of 
actors, usually understood to be German negotiators intending to create a Europe in 
their own image (for example, Dale and El-Enany, 2013). The perception of Germany 
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as a self-consciously domineering actor has increased as a result of the eurozone 
crisis, although the extent to which Germany has ever been willing to accept the 
mantle of a regional hegemon is disputed (McNamara, 1998, Bulmer and Paterson, 
2013, Matthijs, 2016). 
 
Likewise, Young (2014) suggests that German strategy in promoting ordoliberal 
outcomes at the EU level has less to do with its own commitment to strict 
ordoliberalism in the domestic arena, and more to do with the desire to guard 
against the negative externalities of other countries’ deficits. Thus, the projection of 
ordoliberalism as an ideal type organisation owes to myths about Germany’s own 
economic model, together with self-protection rather than power politicking. 
Therefore, something empirically akin to ordoliberalism instead arises as a 
deliberative compromise between actors pursuing disparate economic agendas that 
are otherwise completely removed from it (Schneyder and Siems, 2013, Ito, 2012). As 
Jones (2013, p.150) suggests, in the context of EMU, ‘(ordoliberalism’s) rule-based 
framework should be interpreted as an agreement to disagree and not as the 
imposition of German norms on the rest of Europe.’ Moreover, economic integration 
has over time been considered one of the more obvious examples of German norm 
imposition (for example, McNamara, 1998, Maes, 2004).  
 
Second, we consider the possibility that the EU’s ordoliberal order is less a coherent 
ideological position uploaded from Germany to the EU, and more the outcome of 
clashes between Keynesian and neoliberal viewpoints in European negotiations, 
which approximates an ordoliberal constitutional settlement. For this we return to 
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Nedergaard and Snaith’s description of ordoliberalism as situated somewhere 
between Keynesianism and neoliberalism, approximating some aspects of neoliberal 
market prioritisation, and some aspects of Keynesian state intervention, without 
being ideologically in agreement with either (2014, p.1098). In other words, 
ordoliberalism appears to emerge as a credible compromise position when these two 
oppositional views are contested within Europe. Differentiated integration fits as one 
aspect of this picture, but we can also make the suggestion that ordoliberalism 
describes the fundamental character of this tension between minimalism and 
effectiveness. This analysis is supported by Seikel’s (2016) analysis of the EU’s 
institutional balance of power as a result of the euro crisis. In terms of nation-state 
politics, France has long been characterized as fundamentally interventionist 
(dirigiste), if not outright Keynesian (Howarth, 2007). By contrast, Member States 
including the UK have pushed deregulation as an EU policy priority. In this sense, 
an interpretation of ordoliberalism as situated somewhere between these poles 
becomes attractive as a credible compromise, allowing for only as much regulation 
as is necessary but retaining a meaningful role for state intervention. Therefore, the 
outcome can be described as one that has all the hallmarks of ordoliberalism, but 
without ordoliberalism per se having provided the theoretical or practical 
underpinnings. 
 
Third, ordoliberalism may appear to characterize contemporary integration, 
somewhat as a matter of coincidence, because of the type of steps that have been 
taken since the economic crisis of 2008. In other words, the concentration of measures 
in the field of economic integration largely fits with the conventional terrain of 
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ordoliberalism we explored above. As suggested above, ordoliberalism can certainly 
be expanded beyond the spheres of economic regulation, but when this is where the 
majority of crisis measures are being taken, it is much more credible that 
ordoliberalism will enter the frame as a means of prescribing regulation. The idea 
that ordoliberalism has ‘returned’ is supported by comparing crisis measures with, 
for example, the Lisbon Strategy, which does not seem to be the product of 
ordoliberal thinking but rather a more neoliberal market-making strategy, and which 
was adopted in a period absent of major economic crisis. Likewise, the focus on EU 
negotiations has been almost entirely on the creation of rules (such as the fiscal 
compact), a form that bears similarity to the idea of the economic constitution to 
regulate government(s). However, caution should be exercised regarding this 
explanation, by emphasizing that much of the international regulation that has 
recently occurred falls outside the scope of what the original ordoliberals considered 
necessary, and thus are necessarily a matter of imputation.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have looked at the interplay between law and political economy in 
a contemporary EU increasingly comprised of a ‘multiplicity of legal orders’. We 
posit ordoliberalism as a way into this analysis, and as a model that has witnessed a 
recent resurgence. We have argued that the original tenets of ordoliberalism continue 
to be observable in the contemporary EU and, therefore, understanding 
ordoliberalism is at the very least one way in understanding the EU. Nonetheless, in 
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tracing the divergences between readings of ordoliberalism, we do not fully 
subscribe to the view that the EU as a whole should be characterized as an 
ordoliberal enterprise in the narrow sense. We find that accounts that do so are 
flawed in that they do not recognize that the EU is, and does, more than an 
‘economic constitution’ would suggest. Rather, we emphasize aspects of 
ordoliberalism as a social and economic order that are rarely brought to the fore in 
the bulk of analysis focussing on competition law or economic regulation. We find a 
need to continue to look for ordoliberal qualities across the EU rather than merely 
viewing it as a system that facilitates policy-making in certain (largely economic) 
spheres.  
 
We suggest that the ideology of ordoliberalism has been successful less because it is 
appropriate and more because it is German, and thus tied to the nation that has been 
historically by far the most powerful actor in the EU’s economic policy-making 
negotiations. Furthermore, the revival of ordoliberalism since the advent of the euro 
crisis cannot be seen in isolation from the central role played (or at the very least, 
perceived as being played) by Germany as a legal, political and economic rule setter. 
Note that this is a very different argument to the one we critiqued of Germany 
‘pushing’ an ordoliberal agenda as part of a conscious strategy; this represents 
instead the idea of Germany filling a vacuum exposed by economic weakness. In this 




The evolving legal-institutional dynamics in European integration need also to be 
accounted for. Differentiated integration here is key: whilst it is untrue that the legal, 
political and economic systems of the EU have only ever been unitary, it is only 
much more recently that the possibilities of a ‘multi-speed’ Europe have been 
seriously considered as a way forward in the integration process.  Therefore, we 
suggest that ordoliberalism serves as a convenient meta-theory to describe 
conventional integration. But this does not extend to explaining future differentiated 
integration, since the ‘multi-speed’ Europe is in evidence in some areas which have 
little in common with ordoliberalist thought, past or present. In our emphasis on 
using ordoliberalism as a means of describing contemporary European integration, 
the usefulness of the model is more apparent whilst recognising its limitations.  
 
Of the three readings of ordoliberalism we identified, none can fully explain the 
totality of the EU as an ordoliberal construct unless large swathes of EU law and 
policy are omitted or the same (ordoliberal-inspired) logics occur across different 
policy areas. And doing so would render any account of the EU overly simplistic and 
incomplete. Rather, describing the EU as ordoliberal allows us to maintain the 
connection between some of the key economic areas in contemporary integration 
with the origins of the EU. This avoids the assumption that the whole of EU law and 
policy necessarily operates according the most obviously ordoliberal-inspired areas. 
As a result, we find that ordoliberalism, in its original and contemporary forms, can 
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